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Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 5 (Feb. 25, 2010) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE –RELIEF FROM UNDERLYING JUDGMENT BASED ON
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
Summary
The Court clarifies and explains the procedure announced in Huneycutt v. Huneycutt 2 for
seeking a remand to the district court to alter, vacate, or otherwise modify or change a district
court order or judgment after an appeal to the Supreme Court has been perfected. Additionally,
the Court explains that the perfection of the appeal does not toll the six-month period for seeking
NRCP 60(b)(2) relief.
Disposition/Outcome
The perfection of an appeal does not toll NRCP 60(b)(2)’s six-month period for seeking
relief. Accordingly, the appellants' request for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief was denied as untimely.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellants Ronald Foster, Patrick Cochrane, and Frederick Dornan challenge a final
judgment filed on August 29, 2007. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on September 7,
2007. On July 29, 2009, Appellants filed a motion in the district court, seeking relief from that
judgment under NRCP 60(b)(2) based on newly discovered evidence. Specifically, they sought
to have the district court certify its intent to grant their motion. After the district court certified
its intent to grant the motion, appellants filed a motion in the Supreme Court seeking to have the
matter remanded for the entry of an order granting their motion for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief in
accordance with the procedure established in Huneycutt.
Discussion
Procedure for seeking a remand to district court
In Huneycutt, the court adopted a procedure where a party, believing a basis exists to
alter, vacate, or otherwise modify an order or judgment challenged on appeal after an appeal
from that order or judgment has been perfected, must first file a motion for relief from the order
or judgment in district court prior to filing a motion for remand in the Supreme Court. 3 Despite
the general rule that the perfection of an appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction, the
district court retains a limited jurisdiction to review motions made in accordance with this
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procedure, 4 but it lacks jurisdiction to enter an order granting such a motion. 5 However, the
district court does have jurisdiction to deny such requests. 6
If the district court is inclined to grant the relief requested, then it may certify its intent to
do so. 7 At this point, the moving party then files a motion in the Supreme Court, attaching the
district court’s certification, seeking remand for entry of an order granting the requested relief. 8
If the district court is not inclined to grant relief, it may enter an order denying the motion. 9
Foster, Cochrane, and Dornan’s motion for remand
In the present motion the district court certified its intent to grant appellants NRCP
60(b)(2) motion. Appellants now move the Nevada Supreme Court to remand the matter for
entry of an order granting the relief requested. They assert, among other things, that their motion
was timely.
A motion for relief from a final order or judgment based on newly discovered evidence
must “be made within a reasonable time, and … not more than 6 months after the proceeding
was taken or the date that written notice of entry of the final judgment was served.” 10 Here the
notice of entry of final judgment was entered on August 29, 2007, but appellants' NRCP 60(b)(2)
motion was not filed until July, 29, 2009. This issue then is whether the perfection of the appeal
tolls the running of NRCP 60(b)’s six-month limit.
Federal court opinion on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which was substantially similar to NRCP 60(b)
prior to the 2007 revisions, 11 overwhelmingly concludes that the period for seeking relief under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is not tolled by the filing of a notice of appeal. 12 This court finds the
federal approach to be sound practice and adopts the same approach with regard to requests for
relief under NRCP 60(b). Accordingly the six-month time period for seeking relief under NRCP
60(b) is not tolled by the perfection of an appeal.
Because appellants' pending appeal did not toll the six-month period for seeking relief,
appellants' motion for NRCP 60(b)(2) relief was untimely filed. Therefore the motion is denied.
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Conclusion
The Huneycutt remand procedure is clarified specifically noting that district courts do
have jurisdiction to deny requests for relief under NRCP 60(b). Additionally the six-month time
period for seeking relief under NRCP 60(b) is not tolled by the perfection of an appeal.

